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In 2004, a 9.1 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Aceh, Indonesia and triggered 
a tsunami that traveled across the Indian Ocean. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and 
Thailand suffered the most destruction. Within hours of the tsunami, a massive 
international relief effort began. However, there was no regional effort made by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Even though Southeast Asia sees a 
major portion of the world’s natural disasters, ASEAN had no mechanisms in place to 
lead a regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) effort. The question 
arises: How have ASEAN’s HA/DR policies changed since 2004? This thesis shows that 
ASEAN’s policy evolved through a three-step process from non-commitment to 
commitment, commitment to institutionalization, and institutionalization to deployment 
of assets. Case studies of ASEAN’s responses to the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 illustrate 
the evolution of ASEAN’s HA/DR policy. 
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Since 2004, Southeast Asia has seen significant activity in the realm of 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. The Indian Ocean 
tsunami of 2004 left over 150,000 dead in Southeast Asia. The international response to 
the tsunami was on a level not seen before, with over thirty-five countries contributing 
more than thirty thousand people to the relief efforts.1 During the tsunami response, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) did not take charge of coordinating 
relief efforts. Efforts among member nations were bilateral at first, with the United States 
eventually taking charge of coordinating relief efforts.2 ASEAN’s lack of leadership in 
coordinating relief efforts showed an absence of commitment in its approach to HA/DR. 
The question examined in this thesis is: how has ASEAN changed its approach to 
HA/DR since 2004? This study reviews historical case studies on HA/DR, what policies 
and institutions have been put in place, and how HA/DR assets have been used to respond 
to disasters. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Southeast Asia region has seen a large number of natural disasters in recent 
years. From 2001 to 2009, there were forty-two earthquakes and landslides, one hundred 
and thirty-two storms, and two hundred and thirteen floods.3 Of the disaster total 
worldwide in that timeframe, Southeast Asia saw twelve percent of the total, with forty-
one percent of disaster-related deaths.4 With casualties this high, ASEAN has become 
increasingly interested in coordinating disaster relief efforts. In response to the East 
Timor and Indian Ocean tsunami, non-ASEAN countries and other ASEAN states 
                                                 
1 Udai Bhanu Singh, “Disaster Management in South-east Asia,” Journal of Defence Studies 6, no. 1 
(January 2012), 3–5, https://www.academia.edu/1499483/Disaster_Management_in_South-east_Asia. 
2 Heide H. Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief After the Tsunami,” Südostasien Aktuell 
24, no. 4 (2005), 7. 
3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response: Work Programme 2010–2015, 4th ed. (Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2013), “Introduction,” http://www.asean.org/resources/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-
management-and-emergency-response-aadmer-work-programme-2010-2015-4th-reprint?category_id=382. 
4 Ibid., “Annex 1.” 
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provided relief efforts, but ASEAN did not provide coordination efforts. In previous 
disasters, ASEAN could have provided a regional link for relief efforts that outside states, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even the UN could tap into for 
coordination. Understanding the existing regional institutions and policies t gives 
organizations that would be in charge of U.S relief efforts, such as the Pacific Command 
(PACOM) and III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), the ability to provide liaison 
officers (LNOs) to the right places and ensure that manpower and material are put to the 
best use during crisis responses. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is organized in five parts. The first part discusses the case 
studies of the East Timor crisis in 1999 and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, showing 
ASEAN’s non-commitment to a regional HA/DR response. Part two discusses how 
policies have changed from non-commitment to commitment of a regional HA/DR 
response, as well as the development of institutions to support HA/DR efforts. Part three 
uses the case studies of Cyclone Nargis and Typhoon Haiyan, showing ASEAN’s 
evolution from commitment to a regional HA/DR response to the deployment of ASEAN 
HA/DR assets. Part four deals with changes that have occurred in the international 
consensus on the importance of HA/DR to include the United Nations (UN), the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). 
Part five discusses the debate as to whether or not the changes ASEAN made to its 
HA/DR response is mostly just rhetoric. 
1. Non-commitment in East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
In 1999, Southeast Asian countries were faced with a crisis when the East 
Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia. After the vote, pro-Indonesian militias 
mounted a terror campaign that led to a humanitarian crisis in which almost 1,000 East 
Timorese were killed and twenty-five percent of the population fled to West Timor.5 In 
September 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the Australian-led International 
                                                 
5 “East Timor profile - Timeline,” BBC, last modified July 22, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-pacific-14952883. 
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Force East Timor (INTERFET), even though Indonesia had yet to withdraw its military 
and security forces from East Timor. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines 
all committed personnel to INTERFET; with 1,580 troops, Thailand made the largest 
ASEAN contribution.6 However, the East Timor crisis showed that ASEAN states were 
neither trained nor equipped to lead peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. 
Even after the East Timor crisis, ASEAN did little to advance HA/DR 
cooperation in the region. On December 26, 2004, an earthquake resulted in the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami that caused over 150,000 deaths in four ASEAN countries: 
Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia. ASEAN’s initial reaction was to issue a 
declaration on the tsunami, pledging to strengthen regional efforts in disaster 
management and prevention.7 The declaration fell short of stating that ASEAN would 
assume a leading role in coordinating relief efforts, and showed that ASEAN did not have 
the institutions in place to act as a coordinating agency. Instead, ASEAN’s declaration 
emphasized an international NGO- and UN-led effort. Indonesian President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, representing ASEAN in the UN, asked for the UN to organize 
relief efforts.8 In the absence of ASEAN coordination, member relief efforts for the 2004 
tsunami were initially unilateral, with the United States eventually leading coordination 
efforts.9 The Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team was the first team to 
arrive in Indonesia. Singapore committed seven hundred military personnel to the efforts, 
and pledged $3,000,000 to the effort.10 International assistance also arrived, with the 
United States, China, Japan, Germany and Great Britain among the contributors.11 
                                                 
6 Alan Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis,” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 54, no. 2 (July 2000), 163–67, doi: 10.1080/713613510. 
7 Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 7. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Ibid. 
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2. Evolution from Non-commitment to Commitment to HA/DR 
ASEAN has had a basic understanding of disaster relief since 1971, when the 
ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) began holding biannual 
meetings. Five years later, in 1976, members signed the “ASEAN Declaration on Mutual 
Assistance on Natural Disasters.” This agreement was intended to provide supplies to the 
stricken country, and required that each member country create an agency to coordinate 
efforts internally, but stopped short of creating an ASEAN institution for relief 
coordination.12 The AEGDM rarely met, and in 2002 held its twelfth meeting. During 
this meeting, the group’s name changed to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster 
Management (ACDM).13 The heads of ASEAN members’ national disaster management 
agencies make up the ACDM, and it is responsible for coordinating and implementing 
responses and activities. It first met in December 2003.14 
In the aftermath of the tsunami relief efforts, ASEAN decided that changes were 
needed to facilitate its responses to future crises. On July 26, 2005, ASEAN foreign 
ministers signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response (AADMER). Comprised of thirty-six articles, the AADMER describes how 
ASEAN will coordinate disaster responses.15 One of the key features of the AADMER is 
the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA 
Centre) in article 20, which would serve as a regional coordinating body for relief efforts 
in the event of a disaster.16 The AADMER also established a set of standard operating 
procedures for the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT).17 On 
                                                 
12 Gentner, “ASEAN: Cooperative Disaster Relief,” 4–5. 
13 Ibid., 3–9. 
14 “Overview,” ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-socio-cultural-
community/category/overview-2. 
15 “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Vientiane, 26 July 2005,” 
ASEAN Secretariat, July 26, 2005, http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-
management-and-emergency-response-vientiane-26-july-2005-3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint 




November 17, 2011, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed the “Agreement on the 
Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on 
Disaster Management.” This agreement formally established the AHA Centre, and placed 
its headquarters in Jakarta. The AHA Centre gives ASEAN a regionally controlled body 
that is able to coordinate relief efforts from external states, the UN, and other external 
organizations.18 It also serves as a data collection and early warning center, manages the 
ERATs and material stockpiles, and helps customs process customs requirements for 
relief workers and material to expedite access to required areas.19 
3. From Commitment to Deployment of HA/DR Assets 
On May 2, 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the Ayeyarwady Delta in Myanmar, 
creating the worst natural disaster in the history of the country. The country officially 
stated that 140,000 people lost their lives, and 2.4 million people required immediate 
assistance.20 Three days later, Myanmar authorities made a formal plea for help to the 
UN; however the plea centered on bilateral efforts vice a large-scale international effort 
like the 2004 tsunami. Myanmar also did not make it easier for humanitarian workers to 
get expedited visas or relax their restrictive internal travel requirements. International 
pressure began to mount on Myanmar to open up access to affected areas, with France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States requesting help from the UN Security 
Council, which was rejected by the other council members.21 
In responding to Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN assumed a leadership role by managing 
international efforts and convincing Myanmar to open its borders to international aid. The 
ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan also requested that all member states “provide 
urgent relief assistance through the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
                                                 
18 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (Bali: ASEAN, November 17, 
2011), http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/19th%20summit/AHA.pdf. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Julie Belanger and Richard Horsey, “Negotiating Humanitarian Access to Cyclone-Affected Areas 





Management and Emergency Response,” and on May 9 the ASEAN ERAT was deployed 
for the first time.22 Ten days later, on May 19, the ERAT submitted a report back to a 
Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting with recommendations for better handling the relief 
effort. In response to this report, ASEAN created two institutions, the ASEAN 
Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) and Tripartite Core Group (TCG), to facilitate 
coordination. The AHTF was made up of twenty-two members and its primary function 
was to supervise the TCG. The TCG was based in Myanmar and comprised members 
from ASEAN, the Myanmar government, and members from the UN with the primary 
function of facilitating relief operations.23 
Typhoon Haiyan (also known as Yolanda) hit the Philippines on November 8, 
2013, and ASEAN’s response to the disaster showed that the association’s commitment 
to HA/DR had evolved even further to include early deployment of the ERAT and 
coordination of civilian relief efforts. In the aftermath of the typhoon, Filipino President 
Aquino declared a state of “national calamity” and began to solicit international 
support.24 While the United States, New Zealand, Japan, Australia, the European Union, 
and the United Nations sent money and relief personnel, ASEAN helped out in 
accordance with the AADMER. Prior to Haiyan making landfall, the AHA Centre sent 
personnel to Tacloban City in order to establish an emergency satellite communication 
system. The AHA Centre also sent two members of the ERAT, as well as one person 
from the AADMER Partnership Group to help out the Philippines. The AHA Centre 
mobilized stockpiled relief supplies—such as office kits, generators, forklifts, and mobile 
storage units—from an ASEAN Disaster Emergency Logistics System in Malaysia. The 
AHA Centre coordinated the relief efforts and supplies from member countries and 
chartered government aircraft for delivery to the Philippines.25 While the AHA Centre 
                                                 
22 Yves-Kim Creac’h and Lilianne Fan, “ASEAN’s Role in the Cyclone Nargis Response: 
Implications, Lessons and Opportunities,” Humanitarian Exchange, no. 41 (December 2008), 5–6, 
http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-41/aseans-role-in-the-cyclone-nargis-
response-implications-lessons-and-opportunities. 
23 Ibid., 6. 




was coordinating civilian relief assets, ASEAN received criticism for a lack of 
coordinated defense response. This was done at the bilateral level with Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Brunei each reaching separate agreements with the Philippine 
government to provide ships and aircraft to deliver supplies.26 
4. Changes to the International Consensus on Importance of HA/DR 
With the end of the Cold War, the world began to take more notice of issues such 
as HA/DR that had previously not been prominent on the international stage. There were 
very few organizations that were dedicated to HA/DR: the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of the Red Cross, and Doctors Without 
Borders.27 Then, in 1991, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 
46/182 in response to the growing number of humanitarian crises and the increasing 
number of UN Security Council resolutions authorizing interventions.28 This resolution 
established the United Nations as a leader in coordinating relief efforts to affected states 
and established a committee to serve as a liaison with organizations such as the ICRC and 
other relevant agencies. Resolution 46/182 also allowed the UN Secretary General to 
appoint an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), who would consolidate existing 
emergency response representatives and place the United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator under the responsibility of the ERC.29 
Prior to the 2004 tsunami, the ASEAN Regional Forum held inter-sessional 
meetings for disaster relief (ISM-DR), but suspended those meetings in 2000 because of 
conflicting views regarding the use of member militaries in relief operations.30 In 
                                                 
26 Euan Graham, “Super Typhoon Haiyan: ASEAN’s Katrina Moment?” RSIS Commentaries, no. 
213/2013 (November 25, 2013), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO13213.pdf. 
27 Michael Barnett, “Humanitarianism Transformed,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 4 (December 
2005), 729, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688176. 
28 Ibid., 729. 
29 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 46/182: Strengthening of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations,” December 19, 1991, http://www.un.org/en/ga/ 
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/46/182. 
30 Jürgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation,” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (September 2009), 439, doi: 10.1080/ 
09557570903104057. 
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response to the 2004 tsunami, the ISM-DR resumed in 2005 with the objective to “work 
towards effective mechanisms to achieve substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives 
and in social, economic and environmental assets as well as to respond jointly to disaster 
emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international 
co-operation.”31 In 2006, ARF released the ARF Statement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response, which promoted cooperation among regional and international 
programs that were already in place, and would study the feasibility of creating standby 
arrangements and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Indonesia and Australia also 
conducted an ARF Disaster Relief desktop exercise in Jakarta from May 1–2, 2008 at the 
Naval Command and Staff College in Jakarta, with the purpose of enhancing military and 
civilian cooperation while responding to a country that suffered a volcanic eruption, an 
earthquake, and a tsunami.32 
In 2009, the ARF came up with the ARF Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief and that May held a live HA/DR exercise. The exercise 
was called Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR), co-hosted by the United States 
and the Philippines, and held in the Philippines. The VDR was civilian-led with military 
support, and consisted of a tabletop exercise, maritime search and rescue exercises, and 
medical assistance.33 The inaugural VDR consisted of 600 personnel from 20 ARF 
countries, with the Philippines making the largest contribution of 280 personnel. The 
exercise centered around a typhoon hitting the Philippines in Central Luzon and worked 
on the countries abilities to respond effectively, using lessons from the 2004 tsunami and 
Cyclone Nargis.34 Also in 2009, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) 
released a concept paper for the use of military assets during an HA/DR response. The 
concept paper discussed making available military assets to ASEAN as part of standby 
                                                 
31 Haacke, “ASEAN, From Dialogue to Practical Security,” 439. 
32 Ibid., 440–42. 
33 Ibid. 
34 “20 Nations, 600 Personnel Involved in First ARF Disaster Simulation in Philippines,” Asia News 
Monitor, May 1, 2009. 
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agreements, but only the affected country could request military assistance. The paper 
also pledged military assets to the AHA Centre on a voluntary basis.35 
In March 2011, the ARF conducted its inaugural Disaster Relief Exercise 
(DIREX), with Indonesia and Japan jointly hosting the event in the town of Manado, 
Indonesia. The scenario for ARF DIREX-11 was a 7.5-magnitude earthquake followed 
by a tsunami, and two thousand personnel attended the exercise with the purpose of 
improving coordination between military and civilian agencies.36 The second DIREX 
was held in Thailand in May 2013, and was hosted jointly by the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand. Expanding on the previous two DIREXs this exercise consisted of 2,400 
personnel and had both a field and tabletop exercise. The field exercise encompassed 
activities such as responding to a rock slide and building collapse, establishing 
emergency operation and evacuation centers, and maritime rescue and air operations, 
while the table top exercise was more policy and asset coordination centered.37 The 
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus also held a disaster relief and military medicine 
exercise in June 2013. The exercise took place in Brunei, and was comprised of over 
3,200 personnel from eighteen countries.38 
5. Debate over ASEAN’s Changes 
Despite the advancements ASEAN has made to establish a regional HA/DR 
response the association is still criticized for having not done enough in operational 
HA/DR missions. After Typhoon Haiyan, ASEAN received criticism for being slow to 
respond and for not coordinating a military response for the disaster. Even though 
ASEAN had a team in the Philippines before the disaster struck the majority of the first 
responders came from the navies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. 
                                                 
35 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, Annex D: The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities 
in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, February 27, 2009, https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/ 
8.%20ANNEX%20D%20ADOPTED%20Concept%20Paper%20The%20Use%20of%20ASEAN%20Milit
ary%20Assets.pdf. 
36 “ARF DiREx Strengthens Regional Ties,” Antara, January 25, 2011. 
37 “ARF DiREx 2013 co-hosted in Thailand,” Asia News Monitor, May 10, 2013. 




ASEAN military and monetary contributions did come from Thailand, Brunei, Singapore, 
and Indonesia; however this was done on a bilateral basis and not coordinated by the 
AHA Centre.39 Two foreign ministers from ASEAN member states, Thailand and 
Indonesia, expressed frustration with the slow speed of ASEAN-provided aid. Thai 
Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul even stated on November 14 that “a quick 
response team is needed for ASEAN, the ten countries have human resources and enough 
equipment, so it is time to share and cooperate.”40 
Critics pointed to both the successful AFR DIREX held in May 2013 and the 
ADMM+ HADR/Military Medicine exercise in June 2013 as evidence that the AHA 
Centre should be able to conduct a coordinated military response. The ADMM+ exercise 
was the largest joint ASEAN/ADMM+ HA/DR exercise and involved all the ADMM+ 
countries. The scenario for the exercise was that a typhoon struck Brunei and the AHA 
Centre was activated to coordinate efforts, including military assets. Since the exercise 
was successfully conducted it was expected that ASEAN should be able to provide this 
type of environment to a real-world disaster.41 
The criticism toward ASEAN for slow and uncoordinated defense response does 
need to be put into perspective, however. First, ASEAN is a relatively new participant in 
HA/DR. In the nine years between the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Typhoon Haiyan, 
ASEAN went from having no commitment to HA/DR as a whole, to putting assets on the 
ground before a disaster even occurs. The AHA Centre has primarily led civilian relief 
efforts to this date. In its response to Typhoon Haiyan the AHA Centre did share its 
assessments with ASEAN members so individual countries and organizations could 
decide what assets and relief supplies to send.42 Second, in terms of ASEAN’s disaster 
response efforts should not be compared to ADMM+ and ARF exercises. The first joint 
ASEAN/ADMM+ exercise took place only three months before Typhoon Haiyan hit. 
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SAR Operations,” Pacific Review (March 26, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 
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C. HYPOTHESIS 
The case studies of the East Timor crisis in 1999, the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, and Typhoon Yolanda all illustrate ASEAN’s gradual 
enhancement of HA/DR cooperation. The organization did have a policy on relief efforts 
that dates back to 1971; however, ASEAN did not make actual commitments to 
association-led relief efforts until after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. This thesis 
argues that ASEAN has changed its approach to HA/DR in a three-step process from 
non-commitment to commitment of regional HA/DR responses, commitment to regional 
HA/DR responses to the development of institutions for HA/DR, and from development 
of institutions to deployment of HA/DR assets. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis analyzes institutions created by ASEAN, such as the AADMER and 
the AHA Centre. The gradual development of these institutions in response to specific 
crises is examined in four case studies: the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean 
tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. The East Timor 
and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami show that, while ASEAN members offered relief on 
the individual state level, the association itself did not yet have either a commitment or a 
capability to do so. However, the cases of Cyclone Nargis and Typhoon Haiyan show that 
ASEAN as organization had developed a commitment as well as an institutional 
capability to coordinate and deploy relief assets. 
This thesis is organized into three additional chapters. Chapter II looks at 
ASEAN’s policies from non-commitment to institutionalization to include the AADMER 
and AHA Centre. Chapter II also includes an analysis of changes that have occurred in 
the international consensus on the importance of HA/DR to include the UN, the ARF, and 
the ADMM+. Chapter III shows the evolution from non-commitment to deployment of 
ASEAN’s HA/DR assets through four case studies: the East Timor crisis in 1999, the 
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II. INSTITUTION AND POLICY CHANGES SINCE 2004 
Chapter II is organized to analyze the evolution of ASEAN’s approach through a 
three-step process. The first section shows how ASEAN went from not having a 
commitment to a regional HA/DR approach to the development of that commitment after 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami by discussing the background and adoption of the 
AADMER, the start of the AADMER Work Programme, and the beginning of the 
ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises (ARDEXs). Section two 
discusses the second step of transition from the development of a commitment to a 
regional HA/DR approach to development of institutions to implement this commitment, 
such as the ERAT and the AHA Centre. Section three discusses the third step in the 
process, which was the deployment of ASEAN assets, such as the ERAT and logistical 
supplies, to respond to HA/DR crises. The fourth section details the changes in HA/DR 
efforts throughout the ARF and ADMM+. This is important because the AHA Centre and 
the ERAT participate in both ARF and ADMM+ exercises. 
A. STEP ONE: ESTABLISHING A COMMITMENT TO A REGIONAL 
HA/DR APPROACH 
In 1971 ASEAN members realized that they needed some sort of commitment to 
HA/DR, so they established the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management, which 
met on a biannual basis. Five years later in 1976 the “ASEAN Declaration on Mutual 
Assistance on Natural Disasters” was signed by ASEAN member states. The intent of the 
agreement was to provide supplies in the event that a member state suffered a disaster. It 
also required that each member state create its own national agency to respond to internal 
disasters. However, it did not require ASEAN to establish a regional HA/DR 
organization.43 
When violence erupted in East Timor after the elections in September 1999, 
ASEAN was unprepared, ill-equipped, and not committed to an organized response. The 
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association viewed the crisis in East Timor as “purely an Indonesian matter.”44 Four 
member states—Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—did contribute 
forces to the Australian and UN-led peacekeeping efforts. 45 This landmark contribution 
showed a will by ASEAN states to engage in humanitarian operations. 
In 2002, ASEAN took a small step in increasing its commitment to a regional 
HA/DR approach when it upgraded the AEGDM from an expert group status to a 
standing committee that would meet on an annual basis, known as the ASEAN 
Committee on Disaster Management. This decision to change the status occurred during 
the twelfth meeting of the AEGDM.46 The fact that the AEGDM only met twelve times 
in twenty-one years illustrates ASEAN’s non-commitment to a regional HA/DR 
approach. The ACDM is made up of the heads of each member states disaster relief 
agency, and is in overall control for HA/DR efforts in the region.47 
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami marked the change in ASEAN from non-
commitment to commitment to coordinate a regional HA/DR effort. ASEAN was 
unprepared for the disaster and was unable to coordinate relief efforts. Any relief efforts 
provided by ASEAN states occurred at the bilateral level with Indonesia, or were under 
the coordination of the United States.48 On January 6, 2005, ASEAN leaders met in 
Jakarta and released the “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, 
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and 
Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004.”49 This declaration laid the basis for the 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response by requiring the 
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development of “a regional instrument on disaster management and emergency 
response.”50 
On July 26, 2005, ASEAN finally established its full commitment to a regional 
HA/DR approach when the foreign ministers from all ten ASEAN member states signed 
the AADMER in Vientiane, Laos.51 Composed of thirty-six articles, the AADMER 
entered into force on December 24, 2009. This happened three months after the 
government of the Philippines, the last ASEAN member to do so, ratified it.52 When it 
entered into force it became the first legally binding regional agreement on HA/DR.53 
The purpose of the AADMER is to put a regional face on HA/DR. While many of 
the ASEAN member countries had existing disaster relief organizations and policies, they 
were underdeveloped. The AADMER was designed to strengthen the disaster relief 
capabilities of each member country, but stated that the “primary responsibility for 
implementing the AADMER remains with member states.”54 The AADMER does 
establish any regional authority for building HA/DR capabilities within the member 
states, however.55 This results in a two-tiered commitment for the AADMER. The first 
commitment is to establish both the capacity and rules at the regional level for a uniform 
support to member states across the association. The second is to help each state develop 
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its own disaster management programs.56 The one drawback to the AADMER is that 
there is no way for ASEAN to enforce participation in the implementation or punish 
members if they don’t participate, even though the document is legally binding.57 
In order to fully adopt and implement the AADMER, the ACDM implemented 
the AAMDER Work Programme, and broke it into two phases. Phase 1 occurred between 
2010 and 2012, and the completion of phase 2 is supposed to be finished by the end of 
2015. The Work Programme is split into four “strategic components”: risk assessment, 
early warning, and monitoring; prevention and mitigation; preparedness and response; 
and recovery.58 Since the focus of this thesis is on the relief side of the house, only the 
third area of the Work Programme, preparedness and response, is discussed. 
Drawing authority from articles 8 through 16 of the AADMER, the preparedness 
and response component is designed to “provide specific instructions to further ASEAN’s 
preparedness and its responsiveness to disasters, and ensure rapid and collective 
deployment of ASEAN’s assistance following a major disaster in one or more Member 
States within the ASEAN region.”59 The Work Programme also established a working 
group (WG) on Preparedness and Response under the ACDM chaired jointly by Malaysia 
and Singapore with Brunei, Laos, Philippines, and Thailand making up the additional 
member countries.60 The WG is directed under the AADMER to meet at least once a 
year, with a report delivered to the ACDM as well. The WG on Preparedness and 
Response is responsible for three “flagship projects” during Phase 1 of the Work 
Programme.61 The first project is the establishment of a disaster and emergency response 
logistics system for the ASEAN Region. This includes building stockpiles of relief 
supplies and implementing a supply chain to distribute supplies during a HA/DR mission. 
The second project is the establishment of a fully functional ERAT, which includes the 
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training of ERAT personnel using standardized training procedures. The final flagship 
project for the WG is to finalize the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby 
Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response 
Operations (SASOP). This includes developing and implementing procedures to deploy 
military assets during HA/DR responses, and to conduct exercises (such as ARDEXs) to 
test SOPs.62 
The Work Programme also uses two main “building blocks” to implement the 
AADMER: institutionalization and the creation of training and knowledge management 
systems.63 In terms of institutionalizing the AADMER, the Work Programme states: 
The AADMER is a regional cooperation on disaster management and 
emergency response, it is necessary to institutionalize AADMER at the 
national level, where many of its provisions will take place. While 
programs are developed at the regional level (particularly with the 
operationalization of the AHA Centre), the primary responsibility for the 
implementation of the AADMER Work Programme shall be with the 
Member States.64 
Creating a training and knowledge management system is the second main block 
for the AADMER Work Programme and is broken down in two subsets: training and 
knowledge management. The objectives for the training subset are as follows: train 
personnel at all levels in disaster management and emergency response, ensure that 
responders receive relevant training in their specific fields through a certification system, 
and have a training pipeline that is sustainable.65 The second subset, knowledge 
management systems, is designed to use knowledge and information to aid in disaster 
response and risk-reduction. The objectives of building systems are to determine the 
information needs of ASEAN, create an online resource center to disseminate 
information, and ensure that proper information can get down to communities.66 
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B. STEP TWO: ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONS TO SUPPORT A 
REGIONAL HA/DR EFFORT 
The next step in the evolution of ASEAN’s approach to HA/DR is the 
establishment of institutions to oversee HA/DR efforts. The main ASEAN institution 
involved in HA/DR is the AHA Centre, which was established on November 17, 2011 
when ASEAN foreign ministers signed the “Agreement on the Establishment of the 
ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management” in 
Bali.67 The directive for the AHA Centre comes from Article 20 in the AADMER which 
says the AHA Centre “shall be established for the purpose of facilitating co-operation and 
co-ordination among the Parties,” and with “relevant United Nations and international 
organizations, in promoting regional collaboration.”68 Headquartered in Jakarta, the 
AHA Centre also has the responsibility of responding to disasters when requested by an 
affected member state. The AHA Centre may also act as a coordinating body for outside 
parties offering assistance. Article 16 of the AADMER also delineates the responsibility 
for facilitating the movement of personnel, equipment, facilities, and materials while 
responding to a disaster.69 The AHA Centre currently has a small staff of seventeen 
members and an annual budget of $5.8 million.70 The AHA Centre serves as the main 
hub for the institutionalization of the AADMER through the AADMER Work 
Programme, along with the ASEAN Secretariat and the ACDM.71 Funding for the AHA 
Centre comes from multiple sources. Individual member states make annual donations of 
$30,000, for a total of $300,000 annually. The majority of funding comes from 
international partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.72 
The ERAT is another institution that was created by ASEAN in order to establish 
a regional approach to HA/DR. Working under the AHA Centre, the mission of the 
ERAT is to “respond quickly to a major sudden disaster or man-made emergency in one 
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or more Member States within the ASEAN region.”73 When responding to a disaster, the 
ERAT provides a critical assessment capability to see what supplies and resources are 
needed. This is then sent to the AHA Centre, which distributes it to the rest of ASEAN 
and the international community to help get the right assets to affected areas.74 In order 
to train the ERAT members an induction course was implemented.75 From 2010 through 
2013, the Singapore Civil Defense Force conducted three courses in Singapore.76 In 2014 
the AHA Centre took control of training the AHA Centre from Singapore and held their 
first induction course in Jakarta that June.77 Currently there are ninety-one members of 
the ERAT.78 
Institutionalization of the AADMER occurs through capacity building at three 
levels: within ASEAN itself, among member states, and inside the member states. At the 
ASEAN level, in addition to the AHA Centre and ERAT, it also includes using the 
AADMER Partnership Group (APG) to coordinate NGO support of the AADMER.79 
The APG began in 2009 during the meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat to establish the 
AADMER Work Programme. Its mission is to serve as a partnership between ASEAN 
and seven NGOs: ChildFund International, HelpAge International, Mercy Malaysia, 
Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children International, and World Vision 
International.80 Since its inception, the APG has educated 194 NGOs about the 
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AADMER. It has also helped Cambodia incorporate the AADMER into its National 
Emergency Management Policy.81 The APG also participated in DIREX-11.82 
Two other ASEAN-level institutions that were established are the Disaster 
Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) and the Disaster Monitoring and 
Response System (DMRS). Both institutions fall under the AHA Centre. The DELSA is 
headquartered in Subang, Malaysia launched on December 7, 2012, and is co-located 
with the UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD).83 The DELSA is the logistics hub 
for stockpiles of quickly-deployable relief supplies for the ERAT and other responders.84 
The supplies stockpiled at the DELSA include “mobile storage units, office and living 
prefabs, generators, family tents, ASEAN Family Kits, rescue boats, ready-to-eat meals, 
and office supplies.”85 In order to fund the DELSA, ASEAN partnered with Japan 
through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).86 The establishment of the DELSA 
marked the completion of another flagship program during Phase 1 of the AADMER 
Work Programme.87 During the response to Typhoon Haiyan, the DELSA provided 
supplies such as drinking water, family kits, tarps, and other relief supplies to the 
Philippines for distribution by relief workers.88 
Launched on April 12, 2012, the DRMS provides the AHA Centre with the ability 
to track disasters in real-time across the region in one system. The Pacific Disaster Center 
(PDC), a U.S. organization in located Hawaii, installed the system and trained AHA 
Centre personnel to operate it. It is funded by the US Agency for International 
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Development (USAID).89 Launching the DRMS marked the completion of a flagship 
project for Phase 1 of the AADMER Work Programme.90 The DRMS became fully 
operational in January 2013.91 
In order to institutionalize among member states, a set of standard practices was 
required to develop a uniform approach to HA/DR.92 To do this ASEAN established a set 
of standard operating procedures to guide relief efforts. This set of procedures is called 
the SASOP: Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangements and 
Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations.93 The 
SASOP guides how standby arrangements are initiated and established within ASEAN, 
how disaster relief and emergency response operations are conducted, how military and 
civilian assets are used during a response, and how disaster relief exercises in ASEAN 
are conducted. It also provides templates for requesting assistance, sharing information, 
and providing updates on disaster relief responses.94 The first version of the SASOP was 
signed in 2005, and first used during the response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The SASOP 
entered into force in 2009.95 The AHA Centre demonstrated the success of the SASOP 
during its response to Typhoon Haiyan when the Philippine government requested ERAT 
assistance through the SASOP; and Brunei and Malaysia offered assistance to the AHA 
Centre through the forms.96 When it finalized the SASOP in 2011, and validated it in 
subsequent ARDEX’s, ASEAN marked the completion of one of the flagship projects for 
Phase 1.97 
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Within member states, ASEAN institutionalized the AADMER when it developed 
National Focal Points (NFPs) and established the AHA Centre Executive Program. One 
of the ways that institutionalization occurs at the state level is through the designation of 
NFPs under article 22 of the AADMER. The AADMER NFP is the single point of 
contact for implementing the agreement and SOPs within their respective state. Each 
state already had to designate a focal point for the ACDM, and the AAMDER suggested 
that each NFP be the same for both.98 The second way ASEAN institutionalized the 
AADMER at the state level is through the AHA Centre Executive Program. The program 
is a training course that started in January 2104 and lasts six months.99 The course is 
designed to familiarize disaster management officials from member states in AHA Centre 
operations and other states disaster management agencies. Course attendees also receive 
training in areas including on the job training at the AHA Centre, civil-military 
coordination, humanitarian logistics and supply chain management, emergency 
operations training, and ERAT training.100 
C. STEP THREE: FROM DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS TO 
DEPLOYMENT OF HA/DR ASSETS 
The third step in ASEAN’s evolution of its approach to HA/DR is the deployment 
of HA/DR assets like the ERAT. During a disaster, the ERAT will work with the NFP 
(National Focal Point) of the affected country to accomplish four functions: form an 
initial assessment of the area, figure out the scale of damage, determine what the affected 
population immediately needs, and coordinate with the AHA Centre to mobilize and 
deploy the appropriate resources. In order to request assistance from the ERAT, the 
affected ASEAN state submits a report to the AHA Centre. The AHA Centre then 
notifies the ERAT, as well as other member states to request additional assistance.101 
Once notified the ERAT has a mobilization timeline of eight hours and is designed to be 
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deployed for up to fourteen days.102 Figure 1 shows the flow chart for ERAT 
deployment. 
 
Figure 1.  Flow Chart for ERAT Deployment103 
The ERAT saw its first deployment on May 9, 2008, two months after its 
creation, when eight members responded to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar.104 In October 
2009, another ERAT deployed to Laos in support of the Joint Damage and Loss 
Assessment for Typhoon Ketsana.105 Since 2009 ERATs have deployed seven times. In 
2010 the ERAT deployed to Mentawai, Indonesia, following an earthquake and tsunami. 
In 2011 it deployed to Bangkok in response to massive floods. In 2012 it deployed seven 
members to the Philippines in response to Typhoon Bopha. Following an earthquake in 
Bohol, the Philippines, in 2012 the ERAT deployed four members to assist relief efforts. 
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In 2013 the ERAT deployed twice: first two members went to Jakarta during the floods, 
and then fifteen members deployed in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. 
The ERAT’s most recent deployment saw five members go to the Philippines and 
Vietnam is support of the Typhoon Rammasun recovery efforts.106 
ASEAN also showed how it moved from the second step, development of 
institutions to support HA/DR responses, to the third step, deployment of assets, through 
the organization and execution of the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Exercises. 
The ARDEXs began in 2005 with ARDEX-05. The purpose of the ARDEXs is to use the 
SASOP procedures operationally and test joint responses to a simulated disaster using 
host-country agencies, ASEAN Member States agencies, and any teams from 
international agencies that are invited.107 The inaugural ARDEX (ARDEX-05) began on 
September 19, 2005. Hosted by Malaysia, the exercise involved responding to an 
earthquake affecting Selangor, Malaysia. Search and rescue teams from Malaysia, 
Brunei, and Singapore deployed in response.108 
The second ARDEX (ARDEX-06) was hosted by Cambodia on September 27, 
2006. This exercise focused on responding to flooding in the Takhmau and Kein Svay 
districts of Cambodia, and involved response teams from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.109 Singapore hosted the third ARDEX (ARDEX-
07), which began October 20, 2007 and took place in the Mandai Training Village. This 
exercise focused on the scenario of collapsed residential buildings and the response of 
Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USAR). Singapore led the response with assistance 
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from ASEAN countries, as well as UN teams.110 ARDEX-08 was the fourth ARDEX and 
held in August 2008. Hosted by Thailand the exercise involved the response to a typhoon 
hitting the Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate with teams from Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Singapore assisting Thai responders. ERAT members were also 
involved, as were members of the United Nations Officer for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Thai Red Cross, and the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Red Crescent.111 ARDEXs were 
planned for 2009 and 2010, but were cancelled due to real world disasters. The most 
recent exercise, ARDEX-13, was the first since the AHA Centre became operational, and 
was hosted by Vietnam in October 2013. ARDEX-13 involved a response to a Super 
Typhoon that hit the coastal Northern Delta provinces.112 Participants included ASEAN 
countries and the ERAT; Japan, China, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, 
and the United Nations also sent observers for the exercise.113 
D. INCREASED HA/DR EFFORTS BY THE ARF AND ADMM+ 
Since 2004 both the ARF and ADMM+ have increased their involvement in 
HA/DR. In 2004 the ARF renewed its involvement in HA/DR when its ISM-DR resumed 
in response to the 2004 tsunami. The ISM-DR was suspended back in 2000 due to 
conflicting views among its members concerning the use of military forces during 
HA/DR operations.114 Because of the severity of the tsunami, the ARF decided that the 
ISM would reconvene for the 2005–2006 inter-sessional year with Indonesia and China 
                                                 
110 AHA Centre, “Disaster Exercise.” 
111 “Announcement by the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM): ASEAN’s 
Regional Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance Capacities Put to the Test in Simulated 




112 AHA Centre, “Disaster Exercise.” 
113 “ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise Begins in Hanoi Today,” ASEAN 
Secretariat News, October 21, 2013, http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-
disaster-emergency-response-simulation-exercise-begins-in-hanoi-today. 
114 Haacke, “ASEAN, From Dialogue to Practical Security,” 439. 
 26 
as the co-chairs.115 The ISM-DR convened on November 30, 2005, and was attended by 
representatives from the ARF Member States, as well as representatives from the 
European Union, the ASEAN Secretariat, the IFRC, and UN OCHA. This meeting 
discussed the need for coordinated responses, early warning programs, as well as an 
overview of the AADMER.116 In May 2006 the ARF Statement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response was released after the Yogyakarta and Central Java 
earthquakes. This stated that the participants would try to increase cooperation and 
support regional and international efforts in risk identification, disaster prevention, 
disaster relief, and capacity building. The statement also called for the ARF to develop 
standby arrangements for HA/DR responses. During the fourteenth ARF Ministerial 
Meeting in 2007 the ARF adopted the ARF General Guidelines for Disaster Relief 
Cooperation, which resulted from China’s efforts to establish procedures during HA/DR 
responses.117 
In May 2008, the ARF held its first disaster relief desktop exercise in Jakarta, 
organized by Indonesia and Australia. This scenario revolved around the response to a 
volcanic eruption, earthquake, and tsunami, with the objectives of improving “civil and 
military coordination in disaster relief” and promoting “understanding and cooperation 
among ARF participants.”118 After Cyclone Nargis during the fifteenth ARF, the foreign 
ministers requested that the ISM-DR co-chairs develop the ARF Strategic Guidance for 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. The co-chairs were also tasked to create a 
work plan for implementing the guidelines. This Work Program was revised in 2012, and 
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identifies three priority areas for progress: creating a network to share information among 
ARF participants; conducting rapid assessments, deployments, and accepting provided 
support; ensuring that interoperability and coordination exists between responders during 
HA/DR operations.119 The work plan is supposed to be finished in 2014, yet no progress 
report has been released. 
In May 2009 the ARF conducted the Voluntary Demonstration of Response. This 
civilian-led exercise centered on a typhoon and featured a tabletop exercise, maritime 
search and rescue efforts by the Philippine Navy and Coastguard, and the Japanese coast 
guard, as well as medical and construction field exercises. The United States, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore all participated in 
the field exercises, and other ARF participants, including China, sent observers.120 In 
March 2011 the ARF held the inaugural Disaster Relief Exercise in Manado, Indonesia, 
co-hosted by Indonesia and Japan. DIREX-11 tested joint responses to a tsunami that hit 
Manado. Two thousand personnel took part in the event.121 
The second DIREX, DIREX-13, took place in Thailand in May 2013. Thailand 
and the Republic of Korea co-hosted the event, which aimed to expand on DIREX-11. 
Approximately 2,400 personnel took part in both field and tabletop exercises, including 
responding to rock slides, establishing emergency operation and evaluation centers, and 
maritime rescue operations.122 During DIREX-13 both the AHA Centre and ERAT 
participated. The AHA Centre worked with the UN On-Site Operations Coordination 
Centre (UNOSOCC) to coordinate inter-agency operations. The ERAT partnered with the 
UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) to deploy and provide 
assessment capabilities.123 The third DIREX, DIREX-15, took place from May 24–28, 
                                                 
119 ARF DiREx 2015, ARF Work Plan for Disaster Relief 2012–2014, 2012, 
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/References/ARF%20Work%20Plan%20on%20Disaster%20Relie
f%202012-2014%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. 
120 Haacke, “ASEAN, Transnational Challenges,” 145. 
121 Antara, “ARF DIREX Strengthens Regional Ties.” 
122 Asia News Monitor, “ARF DiREx 2013 co-hosted in Thailand.” 
123 Petz, Strengthening Regional and National Capacity, 19. 
 28 
2015.124 It was held in Kedah and Perils, Malaysia, with Malaysia and China as co-hosts. 
The exercise consists of a response to a super typhoon in the northern regions of the 
Malaysian Peninsula, with the goal of building upon the previous two DIREXs and 
effectively implementing the AADMER.125 DIREX-15 included over 1,700 personnel 
from twenty-two countries.126 
In 2013 the ADMM+ held its inaugural Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Response and Military Medicine exercise in Brunei. The exercise involved more than 
3,000 personnel from all eighteen ADMM+ countries and centered on the response to the 
fictional Typhoon Simpur. The AHA Centre successfully handled the request for 
assistance from Brunei, and established a Multi-National Coordination Center to 
coordinate all aid.127 
E. CONCLUSION 
During the East Timor crisis in 1999 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
ASEAN did not have a committed regional HA/DR approach. The 2004 tsunami marked 
the turning point and ASEAN developed the commitment to a regional HA/DR approach. 
It did this by signing the AADMER and instituting the AADMER Work Programme to 
implement the AADMER once it was ratified and entered into force. Next ASEAN 
developed institutions such as the AHA Centre, the ERAT, DELSA, and DRMS in order 
to support a regional HA/DR effort. ASEAN reached the third step, deployment of its 
own HA/DR assets, in 2008 when it deployed the ERAT for the first time in response to 
Cyclone Nargis. In addition to real-world deployments, ASEAN also started conducting 
ARDEXs in 2005 to strengthen responses. This evolution happened concurrently with 
measures by the ARF and ADMM+ to increase their own HA/DR capabilities.  
                                                 
124 “DiREx 2015,” ARF DiREx 2015, last modified July 20, 2014, http://arfdirex2015.my/index.php/ 
about/direx2015. 
125 Ibid. 
126 “Inputs From ARF-DiREX’s Table Top Exercise to Help Enhance Disaster Management,” 
Malaysian National News Agency, May 25, 2014, ProQuest 1682969377. 
127 Scott Cheney-Peters, “Southeast Asian Rivals Work Together in Disaster Relief Exercise,” USNI 
News, June 24, 2013, http://news.usni.org/2013/06/24/southeast-asian-rivals-work-together-in-disaster-
relief-exercise. 
 29 
III. CASE STUDIES: HOW ASEAN EVOLVED ITS  
RESPONSE TO HA/DR 
This chapter discusses four important case studies in the evolution of ASEAN’s 
approach to HA/DR: the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. With the East Timor crisis in 
1999 and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ASEAN did not have the commitment to an 
organized response as an association, even though member states did send forces and 
supplies either individually or part of a larger multi-national effort. After the 2004 
tsunami, ASEAN realized that it needed to be able to respond to crises within the 
association. The AADMER was passed and signed, the ERAT formed, the AHA Centre 
established, and ARDEXs started. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN provided two 
important services. First, as an organization it convinced Myanmar to allow international 
relief efforts in. Second, the disaster marked the first deployment of the ERAT, just two 
months after being organized. Typhoon Haiyan shows ASEAN’s further evolution, when 
members of the ERAT deployed to Tacloban ahead of the typhoon hitting the Philippines. 
A. THE EAST TIMOR CRISIS 
In December 1975, Indonesia invaded and annexed East Timor after it was 
granted independence by Portugal; in January 1999, after forty-three years under 
Indonesian rule, President B. J. Habibie of Indonesia announced that if the East Timorese 
rejected autonomy, then he would consider independence for the region.128 Then, on May 
5, 1999, the governments of Indonesia and Portugal signed the “Agreement between the 
governments of Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor,” which was also 
signed by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General. This set the stage for a vote by the East 
Timorese, as to whether they would become a special autonomous region inside 
Indonesia or an independent country. If the vote failed, then Indonesia would transfer 
control of East Timor to the United Nations for transition to independence. The UN was 
put in charge of monitoring the vote while the Indonesian government retained 
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responsibility for security.129 Then on June 11, 1999 the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1246 which provided for the creation of the United Nations Mission in East 
Timor (UNAMET).130 Three ASEAN member states—Thailand, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines—contributed personnel to UNAMET.131 The vote on autonomy took place 
August 30, 1999, and on September 1 riots broke out in Dili causing the UN compound to 
be sealed.132 The UN announced the results of the vote on September 4, with 78.5 
percent of the vote against autonomy and in favor of independence. This caused the pro-
Indonesian militias to increase their violence.133 On September 12, President Habibie 
sent a formal request to the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to East Timor. 
Three days later, on September 15, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 
which became the legal basis for the Australian-led International Force East Timor.134 
Although INTERFET was Australian-led, it had significant contributions from 
ASEAN member states. Major General Songkitti Jaggabatara of Thailand served as the 
deputy commander for the force. Thailand also contributed 1,600 personnel to the force, 
the second largest contribution to the force.135 Malaysia initially refused to participate in 
INTERFET because it was Australian-led, but consented after negotiations with the 
Indonesian government.136 Singapore and the Philippines also contributed personnel, 
ships, and aircraft to INTERFET.137 When the United Nations Transitional 
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Administration East Timor (UNTAET) took over from INTERFET in February 2000, the 
first two commanders of the force were from the Philippines and Thailand, 
respectively.138 
Before the United Nations began its involvement in East Timor in 1999, ASEAN 
took the position that “East Timor was purely an Indonesian matter.”139 ASEAN’s 
inaction as an association was heavily criticized and questions were raised in the West 
about the usefulness of the organization in solving regional problems.140 Individually five 
member states did step up and provide forces for operations in another member state, 
which at that time was a “groundbreaking development for the region.”141 By stepping up 
and contributing forces ASEAN members showed that there was a will within the 
organization to participate in humanitarian operations.142 
B. 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 
On December 26, 2004, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of 
Aceh, Indonesia. This resulted in a massive tsunami that made its way across the Indian 
Ocean causing complete devastation as far away as Tanzania.143 The coasts of four 
ASEAN countries saw significant damage to their coastlines: Indonesia, Thailand, 
Myanmar, and Malaysia.144 Aceh saw the greatest devastation: over 130,000 people died, 
over 36,800 were missing, and over 500,000 people lost their homes.145 Thailand also 
suffered extensive damage and over 5,000 people lost their lives.146 Figure 2 details the 
deaths by state. Aceh’s count is combined with Indonesia. 
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Figure 2.  Breakdown of 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Death Toll by Country147 
In Indonesia, responders—including the armed forces—found themselves 
completely overwhelmed. Due to ongoing security operations in Aceh, the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (TNI) already had 40,000 troops in the area. These troops were 
immediately instructed to take up a more humanitarian role. The day after the disaster, 
December 27, the Indonesian government requested the UN take the lead in coordinating 
incoming international relief efforts. Indonesian President Yudhoyano also opened up 
Aceh to international personnel since it was previously closed off to outsiders. The 
government also realized that existing HA/DR procedures did not include allowing entry 
of international relief workers, so the government issued temporary instructions. These 
instructions included waiving visa requirements and allowing relief supplies to go 
through without a customs check.148 Indonesia also realized that it needed assistance 
from foreign militaries. The TNI commander, General Endriartono Sutarto sent personal 
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requests for assistance to the following countries: Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Malaysia and the United States. These personal requests were negotiated bilaterally 
through the Indonesian government.149 Malaysia’s “Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance 
and Rescue Team” was the first foreign asset to arrive on scene in Aceh. Malaysia also 
sent in 300 soldiers to Aceh, set up a relief center to hold up to 10,000 people, and sent 
one naval vessel to help with relief efforts.150 Malaysia also contributed four aircraft and 
133 medical personnel.151 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) sent in cargo aircraft—C-130 
Hercules—for relief efforts beginning on December 28, 2004, bringing medical and other 
relief supplies to Aceh. SAF helicopters began missions the next day, December 29, 
when they flew in a medical team. Three amphibious ships, six C-130s, and eight 
helicopters were all in Aceh by the end of the year. On the ground, Singapore had 130 
medical officials as well as 103 engineers in the area who helped the TNI conduct 
missions such as supply transport, casualty evacuation, and providing access to affected 
areas.152 Brunei also sent one helicopter, one cargo aircraft, and a medical team.153 
Indonesia hosted a summit on January 6, 2005, to bring together both ASEAN 
and world leaders. The attendees at this conference included Australia, New Zealand, the 
European Union, India, the World Bank, and twenty-one other countries and 
organizations. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono personally asked the 
UN for assistance on behalf of ASEAN.154 It was at this summit that ASEAN took its 
first step—thirteen days after the disaster—when it issued the “Declaration on Action to 
Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Prevention on the 
Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004.”155 This 
declaration called for the United Nations to take the lead in relief efforts and decided to 
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“establish regional mechanisms on disaster prevention and mitigation.”156 By asking the 
United Nations to lead all disaster relief efforts, ASEAN showed that it was unprepared 
and ill-equipped to deal with HA/DR efforts.157 The declaration did lead to the signing of 
the AADMER in July, which represented ASEAN’s transition from non-commitment to 
commitment to the development of a regional HA/DR approach. 
C. CYCLONE NARGIS 
On May 2, 2008 Cyclone Nargis slammed into the Irrawaddy Delta region of 
Myanmar, which is home to approximately one-eighth of the Burmese population. With 
winds reaching 132 miles an hour, Cyclone Nargis devastated approximately nine 
thousand square miles of the delta.158 Aid from existing supply stocks in Rangoon (also 
known as Yangon) was available from a small contingent of international agencies 
already had ongoing projects in the country. Burmese authorities informally requested aid 
through the UN as early as May 5, but did not do anything to accelerate the visa process 
or expedite the entry of international aid workers. Workers who were already in the 
country were able to access affected areas, but due to the devastation their access was 
limited.159 
1. Myanmar’s Restrictions on Relief 
The USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group was dispatched from Thailand to 
Burma with relief supplies, as well as the USS Kitty Hawk and USS Nimitz carrier strike 
groups.160 British and French ships took positions off the coast of Myanmar to deliver aid 
as well. Myanmar was not allowing any ship-to-shore movements, however.161 United 
Nations flights were allowed into Myanmar on a limited basis, however. On May 7 the 
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UN was given authorization for flights to begin.162 U.S. military flights began on May 
12, with fixed-wing cargo aircraft only, and were eventually allowed to fly from Utapao 
into Rangoon. The U.S. military was not allowed to offload or distribute the gear; only 
Burmese personnel were allowed to do that. Two more flights were allowed which 
brought in over 72,000 pounds of relief supplies.163 The U.S. military-led Joint Task 
Force Caring Response (JTF-CR) was allowed to make a total of 185 aid flights into 
Rangoon.164 JTF-CR also offered CH-53 Super Stallion and CH-46 Sea Knight 
helicopters to deliver relief supplies brought ashore to Mae Sot, Thailand, however the 
Burmese rejected these after several attempts. Thailand and Singapore also offered the 
use of their helicopters, but the Burmese turned these requests down as well.165 On May 
15, the junta told international relief workers to leave the Irrawaddy Delta, and in some 
cases doctors and medics were turned away at military checkpoints.166 
In the meantime France, the United Kingdom, and the United States tried to get a 
briefing by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator to the UN Security Council on May 7. 
This briefing was in the hopes of gaining a Security Council resolution, under the 
responsibility to protect doctrine. Other members disapproved it, however. The European 
Union (EU) also considered ways of dealing with Myanmar. Member countries thought 
that Myanmar’s refusal to let aid in could constitute crimes against humanity. The EU’s 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, said 
that aid should be sent using any means necessary. UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
also said that nothing was ruled out as far as unauthorized deliveries were concerned.167 
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2. ASEAN Steps in 
With all the controversy surrounding relief supplies in Myanmar, ASEAN became 
involved in the relief efforts. This was highly unusual given humanitarian situations in 
the past, like East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, where ASEAN as a whole 
made no substantial actions. As international pressure grew on the Burmese junta in the 
years before Cyclone Nargis hit, ASEAN was criticized for not taking a firm stance 
against the regime.168 Immediately after the disaster ASEAN offered help to Myanmar, 
and urged the member states to offer aid to Myanmar within the construct of the 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. ASEAN members the 
Philippines and Singapore also sent HA/DR experts with the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) team on May 7th, and on May 9th the 
ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team deployed to Myanmar.169 This marked the 
first deployment of the ERAT. The ERAT conducted its assessment from May 9–18. 
During its assessment the ERAT worked with the UNDAC—many ERAT members were 
trained by the UNDAC, making coordination easier—and conducted interviews of relief 
workers and government officials from the Myanmar Information Management Unit and 
the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement. The team also visited affected 
areas in the Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon.170 On May 19, 2008 the ERAT presented its 
findings to the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, where the establishment of a 
“Humanitarian Coalition for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis.”171 Following the 
recommendation of the ERAT, ASEAN leaders came up with a two-tiered system in 
order to coordinate international relief efforts in Myanmar. The ERAT’s 
recommendations created the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force and the Tripartite Core 
Group on May 25th.172 On May 19th ASEAN foreign ministers proposed that ASEAN 
lead the coordination efforts for international assistance, and on May 23rd UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon met personally with Myanmar’s Senior General Than Shwe in the 
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capital of Naypyitaw. This meeting secured a commitment from the junta to allow 
international relief efforts into the country, and since ASEAN would lead it gave a less 
threatening and more of a regional face in operations.173 
The AHTF was the diplomatic arm for ASEAN to engage Myanmar on relief 
efforts. It was made up of twenty-two members: two from the ASEAN Secretariat and 
two officials from each member country. The AHTF supervised the TCG giving it “broad 
strategic planning, priorities, and targets,” and met once a month for the first three 
months.174 The TCG’s job was to monitor and coordinate the resources, operations, and 
reports from the disaster area. The group was made up of an ASEAN component, a 
Burmese component, and a United Nations component. The ASEAN component was an 
ambassador from an ASEAN country, an official from the ASEAN Secretariat, and an 
ASEAN HA/DR expert. The component from Myanmar consisted of three members 
appointed by the Myanmar’s Central Coordinating Board. The UN component was made 
up of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, the Resident Coordinator for Myanmar, and on 
a rotational basis, the head of an operational agency.175 The TCG also took on the 
responsibility of ensuring aid workers had full access and also preparing the Post-Nargis 
Joint Assessment.176 
D. TYPHOON HAIYAN 
Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the central Philippines on November 8, 2013. 
The Category 5 storm was one of the strongest storms ever recorded to make landfall, 
with sustained winds of 195 miles per hour and gusts reaching 235 miles per hour.177 The 
UN estimates that approximately 6,000 people lost their lives, over 4,000,000 people 
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were displaced from their homes, and over 1,000,000 houses were destroyed.178 Figure 3 
shows the path of Typhoon Haiyan through the Philippines. 
 
Figure 3.  Path of Typhoon Haiyan through the Philippines179 
In the aftermath of the typhoon, Filipino President Benigno Aquino declared a 
state of “national calamity,” and solicited international relief efforts.180 
In the weeks before Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, ASEAN conducted 
ARDEX-13 in Hanoi. Coincidentally the scenario for the exercise centered on a super 
typhoon that struck the coast of Vietnam.181 Fifteen days after ARDEX-13 concluded, 
Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines. On November 7, the day before 
Typhoon Haiyan hit, the AHA Centre deployed two staff members and two ERAT 
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members to Manila and Tacloban. The purpose of this deployment was to establish 
emergency communication between Tacloban and the Philippine National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). To help the team accomplish this task, 
the Government of Japan donated access to an International Maritime Satellite 
Organization (INMARSAT) terminal.182 
In order to execute ASEAN’s response, ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong 
Minh directed that the AHA Centre coordinate relief efforts in accordance with the 
AADMER. The AHA Centre then sent a Field Team Leader in from Jakarta, more 
members of the ERAT that were already in Brunei, and a representative from the 
AADMER Partnership Group for a needs assessment.183 The AHA Centre tapped into a 
fund that was set up with the help of the Japanese, known as the Japan ASEAN 
Integration Fund, which covers the DELSA. The AHA Centre supplied two and a half 
tons of rice and 2,000 bottles of drinking water through the fund, and purchased 2,000 
family kits and one thousand tarps to give to the NDRMMC on November 14. The AHA 
Centre also supplied equipment such as prefabricated offices, storage units, tents, 
generators, and office supplies through DELSA to the NDRMMC on November 20.184 In 
order to transport this equipment, the AHA Centre chartered a C-130 transport from the 
Malaysian government.185 
Brunei and Malaysia also provided assistance to the Philippines through the 
SASOP Form 4: Offer of Assistance. Malaysia sent a C-130 aircraft loaded with food 
supplies, blankets, tarps, and medical personnel to assist HA/DR efforts. This airlift took 
three trips and was paid for by the Malaysian government.186 Malaysia also deployed the 
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Special Malaysia Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) to the Philippines.187 Brunei 
also used is own CN-235 cargo aircraft and navy ships to transport rice, noodles, biscuits 
and drinking water. AHA Centre personnel were used to receive and distribute Brunei’s 
supplies to the Philippine government once they arrived.188 
Other ASEAN member states sent assistance to the Filipino government 
bilaterally. The Indonesian government sent $1,000,000 worth of supplies to the 
Philippines. The Singapore Red Cross sent $40,000 in donations and the Singapore Civil 
Defense Force sent a team to Tacloban to work with the UNOCHA rescue operations.189 
Vietnam and Cambodia sent $100,000, and Laos sent $50,000 to the Philippines.190 
E. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III uses the four case studies of the East Timor crisis in 1999, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, and Typhoon Haiyan to illustrate ASEAN’s three-stage 
evolution from non-commitment to an HA/DR crisis to deploying ASEAN assets during 
an HA/DR crises. In the cases of East Timor and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 
ASEAN the capability, or even a commitment as an association, to respond to these 
crises. Individual member states did contribute assets to the missions, which showed the 
commitment of ASEAN states to conduct HA/DR missions. During the response to 
Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN performed three important functions. First, the ERAT deployed 
for the first time ever in order to conduct needs assessments in affected areas. Second, 
ASEAN convinced Myanmar to open up and accept international aid. Third, ASEAN 
formed two bodies—the AHTF and the TCG—at the recommendation of the ERAT in 
order to coordinate relief efforts. The case study of Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated 
ASEAN’s ability to pre-deploy ERAT members to an area and coordinate the delivery of 
ASEAN-provided supplies through the AHA Centre. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami ASEAN’s 
approach to HA/DR has evolved through a three-step process. First, ASEAN developed a 
commitment to coordinating and conducting a regional HA/DR response by adopting the 
AADMER and conducting HA/DR exercises. Second, it built institutions, such as the 
AHA Centre, the ERAT, and DELSA, which created a capacity to respond to crises by 
coordinating and conducting relief efforts. Third, ASEAN deployed assets—the ERAT—
to respond to an HA/DR crisis, and coordinate relief efforts through the AHA Centre. 
During the 1999 East Timor crisis and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ASEAN 
did not have the capability, or even the commitment to respond to HA/DR crises. 
Member states did contribute forces and relief personnel on their own, which showed 
their will to conduct HA/DR missions. For example, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and Thailand all contributed assets to UNAMET, INTERFET, and 
UNTAET. Thailand was the second largest contributor to INTERFET and even provided 
the force’s deputy commander. The first two military commanders of UNTAET were 
from the Philippines and Thailand, respectively. The fact that ASEAN members were 
willing to commit to these missions was unprecedented. After the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami occurred, ASEAN still did not have a regional commitment to coordinate or 
conduct relief operations. However, member states contributed to relief efforts either 
bilaterally or as part of the U.S.-led combined task force. Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore 
sent civilian and military assets in addition to relief supplies. ASEAN’s only action was 
to issue a declaration that pledged to strengthen regional efforts in disaster relief. This 
foreshadowed the changes that ASEAN would eventually make in order to develop a 
regionally coordinated response to HA/DR missions. 
On July 26, 2005, ASEAN took the first and second of three steps in evolving its 
approach to HA/DR. That day ASEAN foreign ministers signed the AADMER, which 
became the world’s first legally binding agreement on disaster management.191 This 
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represented ASEAN’s commitment to a regional HA/DR response and development of 
institutions. The AADMER set the basis for the third step in the evolution of ASEAN’s 
HA/DR approach: development of an institution to coordinate HA/DR missions in the 
region. The AADMER also required the establishment of a regional team to respond to 
disasters, known as the ERAT. The AADMER entered into force on December 24, 2009, 
after it was ratified by every ASEAN member state. The AADMER also required 
establishment of the AHA Centre to coordinate relief efforts. This finally occurred on 
November 17, 2011. Headquartered in Jakarta the AHA Centre is responsible for the 
coordinating the deployment and training of the ERAT, coordinating relief supplies, and 
coordinating the ARDEXs. The AHA Centre also manages the Disaster Emergency 
Logistics System for ASEAN headquartered in Subang, Malaysia. 
After Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar in 2008, ASEAN took the third step in the 
evolution of its HA/DR policy—deployment of assets. On May 9, seven days after 
Nargis, ASEAN deployed the ERAT for the first time. ASEAN also convinced Myanmar 
to allow international relief efforts into the country after the junta blocked relief efforts. 
On May 19 the ERAT submitted its assessment report to ASEAN, and in response two 
groups were created in order to coordinate relied efforts: the AHTF and TCG. 
During its response to Typhoon Haiyan the AHA Centre actually deployed ERAT 
members to the Philippines before the disaster occurred in order to set up emergency 
communication equipment. This demonstrated further development in the third step—
deployment of assets—in the evolution of its HA/DR approach. In addition to the pre-
deployment of ERAT members, the AHA Centre mobilized relief supplies from DELSA 
and contracted Malaysian military aircraft to deliver the supplies to the Philippines. 
Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia also provided military support to the 
Philippines, but their efforts were conducted on a bilateral basis. 
ASEAN still received criticism for being slow to get supplies into the Philippines 
and not coordinating a military response to the disaster. Critics cited the example of the 
ADMM+ HA/DR exercise that was held in June 2013 as a case in which ASEAN had 
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demonstrated the ability to coordinate a military response.192 The foreign ministers from 
Thailand and Indonesia expressed frustration with the pace of ASEAN’s response, and 
even suggested developing a quick response team to deploy.193 The problem with this is 
that ASEAN had already created the ERAT, which had a short, eight-hour deployment 
window. Also the ADMM+ exercise was the first of its kind but only occurred a few 
months before the typhoon, and involved countries that are not members of ASEAN 
itself. To expect immediate results is premature. This does suggest that ASEAN has room 
to grow in its evolution, and in the future could possibly incorporate coordinating military 
responses, not just civilian ones. While its role was not highly publicized, the AHA 
Centre worked behind the scenes to assist the Filipino response agencies, and when 
requested deployed the ERAT ahead of the storm. This response represents “low-profile, 
but well targeted boutique operations conducted by the AHA Centre” which is valuable 
in helping regional responses. This low-profile response can lead to criticism since it is 
overshadowed by larger military and NGO responses.194 
The bottom line is that in ten years ASEAN has gone from having nothing in 
terms of a regional HA/DR response to being able to deploy assets before disasters strike. 
It took the first step and created a commitment to HA/DR by signing the AADMER, 
which was the first legally binding regional disaster management agreement. After the 
AADMER was signed ASEAN established the ERAT in March 2008 and AHA Centre in 
November 2011, and completed the second step in its evolution only six years after the 
AADMER was signed (two years after it entered into force). The ERAT had operated for 
only five years before Typhoon Haiyan hit, and the AHA Centre was in only its second 
year of operation at that time, so both were very young in terms of operational experience 
at that time. 
Understanding this evolution is important to any HA/DR relief response agency in 
Southeast Asia. For example if a typhoon was heading towards the Philippines, knowing 
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that the AHA Centre is going to deploy ERAT members in advance of the storm is 
important. This knowledge would allow NGOs, civilian disaster response teams, or 
military units the opportunity to respond in three ways. First, an NGO or military 
command could send supplies to the AHA Centre for the ERAT to pre-deploy with. 
Second, the leader of either an NGO, civilian disaster response team, or a military 
response team could place an LNO at the AHA Centre in order to ensure that the proper 
supplies and personnel get to the right places. Third, a response team could request that 
an ERAT member embed with it to ensure that delivery of aid is expedited. An embedded 
ERAT member could also ensure that aid, or personnel, is not held up by host country 
customs officials, for example. Agencies like the World Food Program, United Nations 
Children’s Fund, World Health Program, and the United Nations Refugee Agency all 
could provide better relief efforts by partnering with the AHA Centre in both short-term 
and long-term HA/DR efforts in a country. This is in addition to the UNOCHA, which 
already works with the AHA Centre. 
Knowledge of ASEAN’s evolution is also important to the United Sates military, 
specifically III MEF, Seventh Fleet, and PACOM. These commands are often the first to 
deploy U.S. assets in response to a disaster in Southeast Asia. Each of these three 
commands could have a permanent LNO in the AHA Centre so that initial relief supplies 
can be delivered to ERAT members for pre-deployment. After a disaster, if PACOM 
were to stand up a joint or combined command, the commander would know to work 
with the AHA Centre through the LNOs to ensure that the responders get what they need 
in terms personnel and supplies, and that relief efforts are delivered to the right area. An 
LNO at the AHA Centre could also request that an ERAT member embed with a ground 
unit like the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit to help coordinate delivery of supplies. 
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